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FEDERAL SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION AS
A LAWMAKING PARTNERSHIP
JILL E. FISCH
ABSTRACT
In its most recent Halliburton II decision, the Supreme Court rejected
an effort to overrule its prior decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The Court
reasoned that adherence to Basic was warranted by principles of stare
decisis that operate with “special force” in the context of statutory
interpretation. This Article offers an alternative justification for adhering
to Basic—the collaboration between the Court and Congress that has led
to the development of the private class action for federal securities fraud.
The Article characterizes this collaboration as a lawmaking partnership
and argues that such a partnership offers distinctive lawmaking
advantages.
Halliburton II offered a compelling illustration of the lawmaking
partnership, as Congress and the Court together used the Basic decision
as a building block to enable and then refine private securities fraud class
actions. Notably, Congress took affirmative steps through legislation—the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act—to balance the competing policy objectives of
allowing effective enforcement while limiting the potential for abusive
litigation. The process illustrates the three critical components of a
lawmaking partnership: an open-textured statute, sequential adjustments
to the statutory scheme by both the Court and Congress, and a set of
common objectives to guide the lawmaking enterprise.
This Article argues that the existence of a lawmaking partnership
offers the Court the freedom to engage in explicit policy analysis of a type
that is inconsistent with a traditional textualist approach. Put differently,
the partnership operates as a type of rule of construction allowing the
Court to engage in its own analysis of the interpretation that will best
further congressional objectives.
The lawmaking partnership also offers distinctive lawmaking
advantages, including efficiency, political insulation, and comparative
institutional competence. An exploration of these advantages can be used
 Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to
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to identify the potential value of the lawmaking partnership beyond federal
securities fraud.
I. INTRODUCTION
The lawmaking power is generally understood to reside primarily in the
legislative branch.1 In the case of federal law, that branch is Congress.2
Yet it is well documented that Congress does not exercise exclusive
federal lawmaking power.3 The federal courts play an important
lawmaking role by interpreting federal statutes and creating interstitial
law.4 Similarly, the growth of the administrative state has placed primary
lawmaking authority for many substantive areas into the hands of
unelected officials at administrative and independent agencies.5
Coordinating and balancing the exercise of lawmaking power among
these three actors raises difficult questions. These questions include the
extent of Congress’s power to delegate lawmaking authority,6 the weight
to be given to interpretative material beyond the statutory text,7 and the
legal significance of Congress’s failure to take action in response to a
judicial or agency interpretation.8 At the constitutional level, the debate
raises important separation-of-powers concerns.9 Separate from the
constitutional questions, however, are broader policy questions about
comparative institutional competence and the extent to which choices
among lawmakers should reflect considerations of efficiency, expertise,
and political accountability.10

1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 331
(1999) (“Article I, Section 1, vests legislative power in the Congress.”).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (vesting the “legislative” power in Congress).
3. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 407 (2008) (“It has long been recognized that some
measure of lawmaking outside of Congress is permissible, even desirable.”).
4. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power:
Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006).
5. See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 710 (1994)
(reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)).
6. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004).
7. See Lemos, supra note 3, at 431 (considering debate over whether interpretation of an
ambiguous statute allows courts to implement their policy judgments as opposed to those of Congress).
8. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV.
67 (1988).
9. See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional
Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 267, 267–68 n.9 (1986) (identifying separation-of-powers
concerns with judicial lawmaking under the Sherman Act).
10. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
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This Article does not attempt to resolve broad questions about the
legitimacy or desirability of congressional delegations of the lawmaking
function. Instead, this Article uses the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”)11 to identify
a new lawmaking model. This Article argues that Congress and the
Supreme Court have developed the scope of federal securities fraud
litigation through a collaborative process, a process that this Article terms
a lawmaking partnership.12
The partnership should operate as a rule of construction.13 Where the
Court finds evidence of this type of collaborative process,14 the lawmaking
partnership should authorize the Court to use policy analysis in its
interpretation of the authorizing statute to determine how best to further
Congress’s lawmaking objectives. In Halliburton II, this canon of
construction provides independent support for adhering to the Basic
decision.15
The Article argues that not only is a lawmaking partnership an accurate
description of the process used by the Court and Congress to develop the
legal contours of private securities fraud litigation, but also that, in
appropriate cases, it is a normatively desirable method of making
securities law. In particular, the lawmaking partnership offers distinctive
advantages over alternatives such as a narrow adherence to statutory text
coupled with detailed statutory guidance, on the one hand, or a broad
delegation to judicial or agency lawmaking, on the other.
In Halliburton II, the Court considered the continued viability of a
judicially-created doctrine—fraud on the market (“FOTM”).16 The Court
had previously created FOTM in Basic Inc. v. Levinson17 as a tool to

11. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
12. The partnership construct developed in this Article is conceptually similar to, but more
bounded than, the manner in which Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have used the term. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2041 (2007) (arguing that “[i]n the case of statutory
interpretation, courts play the role of junior partners to Congress”).
13. See generally Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1 (1954) (analyzing rules of statutory construction).
14. See infra Part IV (describing the criteria for identifying a lawmaking partnership).
15. This Article does not take on the normative question of whether the Court should use policy
analysis in a broader set of cases than those involving the lawmaking partnership as described herein.
For greater attention to this issue, see, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 345 (calling for “a less passive attitude toward judicial lawmaking” in
subconstitutional matters).
16. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317).
17. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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enable plaintiffs in impersonal public capital-markets transactions to
address the reliance requirement in federal securities fraud class actions.18
By enabling the class action, FOTM dramatically changed the nature of
private securities fraud litigation and generated large-scale cases involving
substantial potential damages.19 In turn, these developments led to
complaints about the resulting scope of litigation and the potential for
litigation abuse.20 Some commentators demanded that the Court reconsider
its earlier decision.21 Commentators also raised their concerns in
Congress.22
Although the Court did not revisit the validity of FOTM prior to
Halliburton II, it responded to claims of abusive litigation by imposing
various limitations on the private right of action.23 Similarly, although
Congress did not speak directly to the validity of FOTM, it responded by
enacting statutory reforms, first in the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)24 and then in the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act (“SLUSA”).25 Both the Court’s decisions and Congress’s
refinements to the statutory framework reflected a common goal of
reducing the prospective of costly and frivolous litigation while
maintaining the viability of private litigation as a means of enforcing the
disclosure obligations of the federal securities laws.

18. Id. at 246–48, 248 n.27.
19. See Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 895, 896 n.2 (2013) (citing sources describing litigation response to the Basic decision); Donald
C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 153 (stating
that “[s]oon after Basic, the number of [open-market securities fraud] suits rose dramatically”).
20. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
533, 533 (1997) (describing claims of abusive private securities fraud litigation).
21. See, e.g., Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (No. 13-317) (urging the Court to “grant certiorari to overrule Basic’s fraud-on-the-market
holding”).
22. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning
Litigation Reform Proposals Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance,
Committee on Commerce, United States House of Representatives (Feb. 10, 1995), available at
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt (testifying against original provision in
House Report 10 that would have overruled Basic). The provision was subsequently deleted from the
legislation that became the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
23. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 (2005) (adopting strict
requirement that plaintiff establish loss causation); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (rejecting aiding and abetting liability).
24. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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The Court in Halliburton II did not discuss this cooperative enterprise
in its opinion; instead, it based its decision on principles of stare decisis.26
Nonetheless, this Article argues that evidence of a lawmaking partnership
supplies an independent justification for the Court’s decision. More
significantly, the Article argues that the virtues of the lawmaking
partnership extend beyond the issue of FOTM and should be considered
by the Court in evaluating the scope of its lawmaking power with respect
to federal securities fraud. Specifically, the lawmaking partnership should
give rise to a canon of construction by which the Court determines how
best to further congressional objectives, rather than limiting its inquiry to
the contours of the statutory text.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, the Article briefly recounts
the traditional story positioning the federal lawmaking function in
Congress and the debate over the relationship between that story and
congressional delegations of lawmaking power to the courts and federal
agencies. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton
II. Part IV conceptualizes the lawmaking partnership and identifies its
structural advantages with respect to the development of federal securities
law. Finally, Part V extends the analysis beyond FOTM and, using the
example of insider trading regulation, explains the potential value of the
lawmaking partnership in enabling Congress, the courts, and the Securities
& Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to collaborate on the development of
federal securities law.
II. THE JUDICIAL OAK OF PRIVATE SECURITIES FRAUD
The starting point for understanding the federal lawmaking power is
Article I of the US Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.”27 While this Constitutional text would appear to vest exclusive
lawmaking power in Congress, the lawmaking function of the federal
courts and government agencies is widely accepted. As Thomas Merrill
explains: “the notion that Congress is the exclusive federal lawmaking
body is an oversimplification of constitutional reality.”28

26. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014) (holding that
petitioners failed to provide “special justification” for overruling Basic).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
28. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21
(1985).
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Federal lawmaking occurs outside of Congress in two distinct fora.
First, Congress delegates extensive lawmaking power to executive and
independent agencies. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century with
the rise of the administrative state, federal agencies have exercised an
increasing percentage of the federal lawmaking power.29 This development
raised questions about the extent to which Congress could delegate
lawmaking authority to agencies, questions that are addressed by the
nondelegation doctrine.30 Broadly speaking, the nondelegation doctrine
accepts the premise that Congress may permissibly delegate some degree
of lawmaking power to agencies, but also that the Constitution imposes
limits on the scope of that delegation, providing that a delegation may
exceed constitutional limits if Congress does not retain for itself the role of
making the critical policy choices that underlie legislation.31
Courts also make federal law. At a minimum, the process of
interpreting federal statutes requires courts to engage in interstitial
lawmaking—addressing questions that the statute does not answer. In
some substantive areas, however, Congress has gone further, enacting
broad legislation and calling upon “the courts to give shape to the statute’s
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”32 The Sherman
Antitrust Act is commonly cited as an example of this type of legislation.33
As Margaret Lemos explains: “The Sherman Act is a clear-cut and selfconscious delegation of lawmaking power to courts.”34
Although the Court has applied different doctrinal principles to judicial
and agency lawmaking, some commentators question whether framing the
distinction in binary terms is appropriate.35 Importantly, analyzing the
appropriate scope of non-legislative lawmaking power entails a common
question: to what extent should non-congressional lawmaking be driven by
policy considerations not specifically identified by Congress?36

29. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
422 n.1 (1987) (observing that the rise of the administrative state began in the “latter part of the
[nineteenth] century and the first two decades of [the twentieth] century”).
30. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1241 (1994) (explaining that “the demise of the nondelegation doctrine . . . allows the national
government’s now-general legislative powers to be exercised by administrative agencies”).
31. Id. at 1237–41.
32. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
33. Lemos, supra note 3, at 429.
34. Id.
35. See id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (explaining that “what judges have done is little different from what the
FTC does”).
36. There are somewhat different reasons to defend a policy-oriented approach to agency
lawmaking, in that Congress may seek to use the structural advantages of administrative agencies to
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This question underlies, in part, a debate about the most appropriate
methodology for statutory interpretation by the courts. Advocates of a
textualist approach, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, ground their defense of
textualism in the constitutional requirements for lawmaking. 37 Textualists
argue that only the legislative text itself—and not its intentions or
purposes—passed “the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment.”38 As such, they view departures from textualism as
infringing upon Congress’s lawmaking power.39 Other commentators take
a more purposivist approach, in which they consider the policy context in
which Congress has acted in promulgating legislation and the purposes to
which that legislation was addressed.40
This debate has an important role in the development of the private
right of action for federal securities fraud. The antifraud provision of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is frequently described as an open-ended
statute that authorizes broad judicial lawmaking,41 although it contains no
express private right of action.42 As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen
we deal with private [securities fraud] actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal
with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn.”43 As a result, the courts have taken primary responsibility for
developing the scope of the private right of action and articulating the
legal requirements for a successful claim.

formulate policy. Margaret Lemos has explored various arguments regarding the relative advantages
associated with the choice of delegate. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s
Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 361, 372–73
(2010).
37. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION
OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (defending Justice Scalia’s view of textualism).
38. Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 988 (2007).
39. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
707–10 (1997).
40. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
76 (2006) (explaining purposivism); Meltzer, supra note 15, at 383–86 (grounding argument for more
extensive judicial lawmaking role in limitations of congressional foresight and capacity).
41. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1052 (1989) (describing Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws as “common law statutes”); see also Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal
Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1 (2015) (analyzing judicial lawmaking in the federal common law
context).
42. In contrast, the federal securities laws contain a number of provisions that create an express
private right of action, including sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and sections 9(e) and 18 of the
1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k–l, 78i(e), 78r (2014); see also, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs
Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 296 (1993) (identifying “eight express liability provisions contained in
the 1933 and 1934 Acts”).
43. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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The judicial development of private securities fraud litigation began in
the lower courts, which recognized an implied private right of action under
SEC Rule 10b-5 as early as 1946.44 Although the Supreme Court did not
reject the private right of action, its early decisions largely articulated
limitations on the scope of a 10b-5 claim.45 Thus, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, the Court held that a 10b-5 claim could not be predicated
upon a showing of mere negligence but required proof of scienter.46 In
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Court limited standing in
private litigation to plaintiffs who had purchased or sold securities in
connection with the fraud.47 In Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the
Court rejected an attempt to address a breach of fiduciary duty through a
10b-5 claim.48
Even before the rise of the new textualism, the Court grounded these
holdings largely on textualist grounds.49 Policy considerations were not,
however, absent from the Court’s analysis. Rather, throughout its
development of private securities fraud litigation the Court sought to
balance the two competing interests of protecting investors and limiting
the potential for litigation abuse. In Blue Chip Stamps, for example, the
Court justified its restriction on the class of potential plaintiffs in terms of
“considerations of policy,” including a desire to limit the potential
settlement value of lawsuits that could not easily be dismissed prior to
trial.50 Similarly, in Sante Fe, the Court identified the concern that a more
expansive interpretation of 10b-5 would create a “danger of vexatious
litigation.”51
The Court’s 1988 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson was different both
in the Court’s extensive reliance on policy considerations and in the fact
that the decision expanded the scope of 10b-5 litigation.52 In Basic, the
Court concluded that private plaintiffs need not offer direct proof of
reliance but can use the fraud-on-the-market theory to obtain a

44. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
45. See Michael J. Kaufman, The Uniform Rule of Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Judicial Creation of a Comprehensive Scheme of Investor Insurance, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 86
(1990).
46. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
47. 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
48. 430 U.S. 462, 474–76 (1977).
49. See, e.g., id. at 477 (“The language of the statute is, we think, ‘sufficiently clear in its
context’ to be dispositive here . . . .”) (quoting Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201).
50. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 742–44.
51. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 478–79 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
52. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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presumption of reliance for securities that traded in an efficient market
tainted by public misrepresentations.53 Commentators have described the
Basic decision as opening the floodgates.54 Yet, even in Basic, the Court’s
role was one of reining in more expansive lower court lawmaking.55
The Basic Court explicitly explained that it was necessary to adapt the
common-law reliance requirement to the realities of the modern securities
markets.56 Moreover, the Basic Court justified its acceptance of the FOTM
presumption not in terms of the statutory text or even congressional intent,
but on the basis of “considerations of fairness, public policy, and
probability, as well as judicial economy.”57 These considerations were
based, in part, on the need to “balance[e] the substantive requirement of
proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites of
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.”58
Importantly, the Court did not act alone in developing the scope of
private securities fraud litigation. Congress responded to the foregoing
judicial interpretations through explicit statutory provisions that in some
cases clarified and in other cases modified the judicially-created legal
rules. In 1995, Congress adopted the PSLRA.59 The PSLRA, which grew
out of the Common Sense Legal Reform Act, reflected both congressional
acceptance of the judicially-created private right of action and a
reassertion of congressional authority over the scope of that right of
action. Included in the statutory provision were a heightened pleading
standard, a discovery stay, an explicit loss-causation requirement, and
refinements to the calculation of damages.60 In addition, Congress adopted
a lead-plaintiff provision in an effort to respond to the argument that
securities fraud class actions constituted “lawyer-driven litigation.”61

53. Id. at 247–48.
54. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 896 n.2 (citing commentary on the effect of Basic).
55. See id. at 910 (stating that “Basic is properly understood not as a revolution, but a
retrenchment”).
56. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–47.
57. Id. at 245.
58. Id. at 242 (1988) (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The modern
securities markets, literally involving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-toface transactions contemplated by early fraud cases . . . .” Id. at 243–44.
59. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
60. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 536–37 (describing provisions of the PSLRA).
61. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead
Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (2001) (describing adoption of the
lead-plaintiff provision).
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Subsequently, in 1998, Congress enacted SLUSA.62 The statute
preempted state-court litigation for “covered class actions” in order to
ensure that those cases were subject to the provisions of the PSLRA.63 In
2002, Congress also extended the statute of limitations in private securities
fraud litigation.64
In legislating private securities fraud, Congress reaffirmed the critical
policy considerations that had previously been identified by the Court.
Congress explicitly recognized the importance of private litigation as a
supplement to public enforcement efforts. Thus, the statement of managers
accompanying the conference report for the PSLRA described private
securities litigation as “an indispensable tool,” both for protecting
investors and for “promot[ing] public and global confidence in our capital
markets.”65 This policy judgment is consistent with the Court’s analysis.
As the Court has repeatedly explained, “private securities litigation [i]s an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
losses—a matter crucial to the integrity of domestic capital markets.”66
At the same time, Congress sought to structure private litigation so as
to minimize the potential for vexatious litigation.67 In the PSLRA,
Congress chose to retain the private securities fraud class action but to
refine its use by implementing substantive and procedural safeguards
against overuse and abuse.68 These safeguards serve similar policy
objectives as the limitations imposed by the Court in cases like Ernst, Blue
Chip Stamps, and Central Bank.
III. HALLIBURTON II
A. The Halliburton Decision
In Halliburton II, the Court considered the question of whether to
overrule its prior decision in Basic, which had allowed plaintiffs to obtain

62. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
63. Id.
64. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2014).
65. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
66. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 n.4 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)).
67. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 534–35 (explaining congressional objective of reducing abusive
litigation).
68. See Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 810 (“Congress chose not to eliminate the securities fraud class action, but
to cure it and thus confirmed its importance to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.”).
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class certification on the basis of the FOTM presumption of reliance.69 The
decision followed several prior attempts by defendants to limit securities
fraud class actions. The Halliburton case had previously been before the
Supreme Court in a decision in which the Court held that plaintiffs were
not required to establish loss causation in order to obtain class
certification.70 The following term, in Amgen, the Court similarly held that
proof of materiality was not required at the class-certification stage.71
Four justices in Amgen raised questions, however, about the continued
viability of FOTM.72 Justice Alito wrote, in a concurring opinion, that
FOTM “may rest on a faulty economic premise.”73 Justice Thomas, joined
in dissent by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Scalia, wrote that the
Basic decision was “questionable” and observed that there was academic
disagreement over the degree of market efficiency upon which Basic was
premised.74
Petitioners in Halliburton II seized upon these statements. They argued
that academic consensus and new evidence about market efficiency had
undermined the economic theory upon which Basic was based, and that
the Court should therefore overrule Basic.75
The Supreme Court disagreed.76 The Court explained that the
petitioners had overstated the degree to which the Basic decision relied on
strong claims of market efficiency.77 Instead, the Court stated that the
presumption of reliance rested on the “modest premise” that “public
information generally affects stock prices.”78 The Court thereby reasoned
that the modern debate about the “degree” to which prices accurately
reflect public information is “largely beside the point.”79 Similarly, the
Court reaffirmed Basic’s determination that most investors rely on a

69. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (describing
questions presented).
70. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185–86 (2011).
71. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013).
72. Id. at 1204–16.
73. Id. at 1204. He therefore reasoned that “reconsideration of the Basic presumption may be
appropriate.” Id.
74. Id. at 1208 n.4.
75. Brief for Petitioners at 15–17, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (No. 13-317).
76. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
77. Id. at 2409.
78. Id. at 2410.
79. Id.
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security’s market price “as an unbiased assessment of the security’s value
in light of all public information.”80
More importantly, the Court observed that Basic’s presumption of
reliance, as a substantive doctrine of federal securities law, was entitled to
stare decisis principles.81 It reasoned that principles of stare decisis apply
with “special force” in the area of statutory interpretation.82 The Court
stated that absent special justification, which the Court found lacking, it
was inappropriate to overrule Basic.83
B. An Alternative Theory for Retaining Basic
In ruling on the request to overrule Basic, the Halliburton II Court
focused the bulk of its attention on the Basic decision itself. The Court
considered the issues that the Basic Court had decided, explicitly and
implicitly, in that decision.84 The Court also reflected upon whether it was
appropriate to look to developments in economics as a basis for
reconsidering the reasoning in Basic.85
Yet, it is possible to uphold FOTM on a different theory. As explained
in Part II above, a key feature of federal securities fraud litigation is that it
has been the focus of a collaborative lawmaking partnership between
Congress and the Court. This collaboration is entitled to special weight
and distinguishes Congress’s role from standard legislative inaction.
Accordingly, this Article makes the novel claim that the Court should
view the existence of the collaborative process as an independent
justification for adhering to Basic. More broadly, the collaboration enables
the Court to evaluate FOTM in the context of the policy considerations
that justify retaining private securities fraud class actions.
As explained above, the Court and Congress have both contributed to
the development of the private right of action for federal securities fraud.

80. Id. at 2411 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192
(2013)).
81. Id. at 2411–12.
82. Id. at 2411 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 2407–13. The Court went on to consider a second argument by petitioners concerning
evidence of price distortion. Id. at 2409–11. It concluded that the defendants in an FOTM case should
be allowed, at class certification, to introduce evidence of lack of price distortion to rebut the
presumption of reliance. Id. at 2414–17. I address this aspect of Halliburton II elsewhere. See Jill E.
Fisch, The Future of Price Distortion in Federal Securities Fraud Litigation, 10 DUKE J. CONST’L L.
& PUB. POL’Y 87, 95–96 (2015).
84. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409 (refusing to reconsider an argument previously
rejected by the Basic majority).
85. See id. (analyzing petitioner’s argument that the two premises upon which Basic was based
“can no longer withstand scrutiny”).
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In understanding Halliburton II, however, it is important to recognize that
a major focus of this collaboration has been the securities fraud class
action. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of FOTM in Basic was motivated
by an effort to enable securities fraud class actions to conform to the
commonality requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.86
Similarly, the PSLRA responded to concerns about abusive litigation with
a range of procedural reforms expressly targeted to the class action.87
SLUSA, in turn, confirmed the focus of the PSLRA by preventing litigants
from using state court litigation to avoid these reforms.88
Basic was clearly premised on the need to reconcile securities fraud
litigation with Rule 23’s class action requirements. The Basic Court
explained: “Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member
of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented
respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues
then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”89 The Court went on to
note with approval the District Court’s conclusion that FOTM offered “a
practical resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive
requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural
requisites of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.”90
This focus was consistent with the intent of the Federal Civil Rules
Advisory Committee, which drafted Rule 23, in 1966, with securities fraud
as a model for class litigation.91 As the Committee recognized, the class
action device was also an important tool for ensuring effective
enforcement of the federal securities laws, explicitly recognizing this
function in developing the rule.92 By accepting FOTM, Basic empowered
private securities fraud litigation to serve as a tool for effective
enforcement and created the opportunity for the development of the
modern securities fraud class action.
Congress specifically focused in the PSLRA on the development of
class action litigation. Section 21D(a) of the PSLRA is explicitly entitled

86. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).
87. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 536-37.
88. See, e.g., Korsinsky v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6085(SWK), 2002 WL
27775, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 105803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)) (observing that SLUSA was intended to “prevent plaintiffs from
seeking to evade the protections that Federal law provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in
State court, rather than Federal court”).
89. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).
90. Id. (quoting District Court) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See Brief for Amici Curiae Civil Procedure and Securities Law Professors in Support of
Respondent at 5, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (No. 11-085).
92. Id.
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“Private Class Actions” and introduces a range of reforms that apply
exclusively to securities fraud class actions.93 These reforms placed
additional burdens on investors seeking to bring class actions, in an effort
to reduce abusive litigation. By tailoring the structure of the class action
rather than eliminating it,94 the PSLRA reflected an implicit congressional
decision to retain the class action mechanism and the FOTM theory that
made it possible.95 Importantly, the adoption of these reforms made little
sense absent a desire to retain the class action mechanism.
More broadly, the PSLRA can be understood as a legislative
compromise in an effort to achieve two competing goals: reducing
burdensome and potentially frivolous litigation while preserving the
ability of investors to pursue meritorious claims. Empirical evidence
suggests that Congress was successful in achieving both goals. Studies
show that the adoption of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard
facilitated the ability of courts to dismiss weak cases.96 A further effect is
that, according to some studies, plaintiffs’ lawyers screen more diligently
for case quality and do not even file weak cases.97 Moreover, because of
the PSLRA’s discovery stay, these cases do not impose burdensome
litigation costs upon defendants.98
At the same time, the lead-plaintiff provision of the PSLRA has
dramatically increased the involvement of large institutional investors in
securities fraud class actions.99 In turn, this has had the effect of increasing

93. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2014); see also Fisch, supra note 20, at 536 (explaining that PSLRA
reforms “targeted the class action structure in particular”).
94. “Congress chose not to eliminate the securities fraud class action, but to cure it and thus
confirmed its importance to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.” Black, supra note 68, at 810.
95. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market: Reflections on
Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37, 42 (2015) (“[T]he structure of the
PSLRA makes no sense unless read as a political compromise that preserves the foundation of the
fraud-on-the market class action while making it harder for plaintiffs to bring, plead, and prove a
successful claim through a variety of reforms.”).
96. See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 636–49 (2007).
97. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2009).
98. See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do
They Settle, and for How Much?—An Update 1, 3 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law
and Econ., Working Paper No. 445, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260831 (reporting
that “38% of [securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010] ended relatively quickly and
painlessly for the defendants”).
99. See, e.g., Michael Perino, Have Institutional Fiduciaries Improved Securities Class Actions?
A Review of the Empirical Literature on the PSLRA’s Lead Plaintiff Provision 2 (St. John’s Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-0021, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2175217 (“There is little doubt that passage of the PSLRA spurred institutions to become
more active in these cases.”).
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settlement amounts in meritorious cases and reducing the fees paid to class
counsel.100
Congress’s adoption of SLUSA reflected similar objectives and
enhanced the effectiveness of the PSLRA reforms. SLUSA was adopted in
response to efforts by plaintiffs to avoid the procedural requirements of the
PSLRA by litigating securities fraud class actions in state court.101 SLUSA
eliminated these efforts by preempting state court litigation.102
Significantly, SLUSA, by its terms, applies to “covered class actions,”
demonstrating both an effort to retain the class action mechanism and to
ensure that this litigation takes place in federal court under the provisions
of the PSLRA.103 In addition, Congress defined the term “covered class
action” explicitly to incorporate the FOTM presumption.104
The foregoing process can be understood as sequential collaboration
between the Court and Congress. First, the Court acted in Basic to identify
the need for the fledgling class action mechanism to enable the costeffective litigation of private securities fraud claims in order to ensure the
litigation served as a viable means of enhancing enforcement. The SEC
evaluated the role of private litigation and defended the class action—to
the Court and Congress—as a necessary supplement to public
enforcement. Congress, after observing the development of the class
action mechanism, adopted various procedures to refine its operation in
securities fraud cases. These adjustments offered the potential for
securities fraud class actions to offer more effective deterrence by
increasing case quality and limiting the potential for frivolous litigation.
The iterative adjustments to the securities fraud class action can be
understood as a type of lawmaking partnership in which both the Court
and Congress have recognized the objective of structuring a procedural
device that facilitates effective enforcement of the disclosure obligations
of the federal securities laws and affirmatively acted to further that

100. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 (2005); Michael
Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund
Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 383–84 (2012) (“[P]ublic
pension participation in securities class actions does indeed lead to higher settlement amounts, all else
equal.”).
101. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (describing rationale for statute).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A)–(B) (2014).
103. A “covered class action” is defined as a class action where “damages are sought on behalf of
more than 50 persons or prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common to those
persons or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on
an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate.” Id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(I).
104. See id.
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objective.105 Because of Congress’s role in responding to Basic and
revising the nature of the securities fraud class action in important ways,
Basic and its progeny are not properly understood simply as judicial
interpretations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. In the PSLRA and
SLUSA, Congress did more than silently acquiesce in judicial lawmaking;
Congress embraced and sought to improve upon the Court’s work.
This lawmaking partnership puts FOTM on a different legal footing
than the standard interpretation of a federal statute. The Court has
struggled with the question of whether to give weight to congressional
inaction. Some commentators have argued that congressional silence or
failure to overturn judicial interpretation of a statute, at least in some
cases, should be understood as acquiescence in that interpretation.106
Others have identified the problems with relying on legislative silence as
indicative of congressional intent, including the fact that multiple
inferences can be drawn from Congress’s failure to act.107 The claim
asserted in this Article is different in a critical respect. With respect to
securities fraud class actions, Congress has taken affirmative action to
refine and reinforce the class action mechanism. Put differently, Congress
has expanded upon the “building block” of Basic.108 This expansion
reinforces the Basic decision as presumptively correct.
Importantly, this Article reads congressional lawmaking with respect to
the securities fraud class action as an implicit endorsement of Basic.
Concededly, this is different from an explicit congressional statement
codifying the judge-made law, and, in the case of the PSLRA, Congress
expressly stated that it was neither codifying nor rejecting any implied

105. Donald Langevoort has questioned my characterization of this collaboration as a partnership,
observing that Congress has the upper hand in that it has the power to override judicial lawmaking.
While the point is well taken, equal decisionmaking authority among all partners is merely a default
rule that the parties are free to modify. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103, 404 (1997).
Alternatively, the Court’s role might be characterized as that of a junior partner, rather than Congress’
co-equal. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., On Viewing the Courts as Junior Partners of Congress in
Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating the Scholarship of Daniel Meltzer 4 (unpublished
manuscript) (arguing that “characterization of courts as junior partners rather than mere agents implies
that they should regard themselves as trusted rather than distrusted agents, with some latitude to look
beyond the letter of statutory language, especially when confronting cases of a kind that Congress
likely did not foresee at the time of a statute’s enactment”).
106. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 8, at 71–78.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable
inferences may be drawn from such inaction . . . .”); Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 186 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“It is impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to
act represents affirmative congressional approval of the [courts’] statutory interpretation . . . .”).
108. See generally Eskridge, supra note 8.
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private right of action.109 As will be developed further below, Congress
might have a variety of reasons for failing to codify such a right of action
expressly, including political constraints and a reluctance to constrain the
scope of future judicial interpretation. These considerations, as will be
discussed, are fundamental reasons for the use of a lawmaking partnership
in preference to constraining judicial lawmaking through a more restrictive
statute.
The implications of the lawmaking partnership constitute more than a
reason for the Court not to overrule a prior interpretive decision, however.
The collaboration reflected in the partnership context suggests that the
Court should understand congressional interventions such as the PSLRA
as refinements rather than rejections of its approach.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING THE LAWMAKING PARTNERSHIP
Halliburton II’s decision to reaffirm Basic is supported by the
lawmaking partnership that has led to the development of the securities
fraud class action. The existence of a lawmaking partnership is not unique
to securities fraud litigation, however. A similar analysis should apply in
other areas in which Congress and the Court have engaged in collaborative
lawmaking. Simply put, judge-made law in the form of a statutory
interpretation that has been developed or reinforced through a lawmaking
partnership should be viewed by the courts as presumptively correct
absent clear congressional action overruling it.
Three distinctive features of a lawmaking partnership warrant this
presumption. First, the original statute, as with section 10(b), must be the
type of open-textured statute that permits judicial lawmaking through the
process of statutory interpretation. Second, Congress and the Court must
engage in sequential adjustments, in each case cognizant of and
responding to concerns that are raised in the other forum. Third, Congress
and the Court must make these adjustments in furtherance of a common
objective.
Each of these features is a necessary component of a lawmaking
partnership. The first, an open-textured statute, has received considerable
attention in the academic literature.110 Commentators argue that Congress
uses this type of legislation purposefully to enable a common-law

109. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 203, 109 Stat. 737, 762
(1995).
110. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517,
1546 (2014); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 338–39.
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process.111 Although this Article does not take a normative position on
whether such congressional delegations are desirable, it is reasonable to
conclude that Congress chooses to use an open-textured statute in cases in
which it contemplates a more expansive interpretive role for the courts.
Reasons for this more expansive role might include limited congressional
knowledge of the consequences of specific regulatory choices and a desire
to encourage the type of evolutionary approach that characterizes
common-law lawmaking.112
The second feature, sequential adjustments by both the Court and
Congress, distinguishes the lawmaking partnership from mere
congressional inaction. By taking affirmative steps in response to judicial
lawmaking, Congress demonstrates that its failure to reject features of the
judge-made law is not the result of political gridlock or inattention.113 By
definition, congressional responsiveness to the Court’s interpretation
reflects awareness of the Court’s actions. Similarly, the responsive
legislation constitutes action rather than inaction, thereby belying
arguments that Congress was unable to react to an erroneous interpretation
because of gridlock, other policy priorities, or inertia.
Finally, a lawmaking partnership is characterized by a common set of
policy objectives. This distinguishes the lawmaking partnership as a
common enterprise rather than two actors that are competing or working at
cross-purposes. Specifically, congressional responses to the Court’s
interpretation should reflect a consistency rather than a replacement of the
policy objectives identified by the Court. Similarly, congressional action
that seeks to correct errors in the Court’s approach or to update policies
that have become obsolete would not qualify.
In the context of private securities fraud litigation, the partnership
structure offers distinctive lawmaking advantages. One advantage is that it
enables Congress to achieve a level of political insulation with respect to
its enforcement policy. Private securities fraud litigation is a political hot
potato and, as a result, an area in which interest-group politics is a
particular concern.114 Corporate issuers and their executives face

111. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 422 (1989) (describing the Sherman Act as “delegat[ing] power to make common law”).
112. See Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1063 (citing examples).
113. This is analogous to the concept of ratified interpretations. If, for example, Congress reenacts
statutory language that has previously been interpreted by the courts, it is presumed to have approved
the interpretation. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
1021 (1992).
114. Cf. Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2044 (2014) (noting that the problem of legislative
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substantial liability risk in private litigation and incur considerable costs in
both insurance and litigation defense. These defendants pressure Congress
to reduce the scope of their liability risk by restricting private litigation.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs’ bar is a formidable political force as well.
One study reports that the amount donated by lawyers, primarily plaintiffs’
lawyers, to federal political candidates since 1990 is more than $1
billion.115 Putting aside the extent to which political donations and
lobbying influence congressional policymaking, it is easier for Congress to
delegate determination of the scope of private litigation to the federal
judiciary, which enjoys life tenure. Judicial lawmaking also provides a
mechanism to overcome the gridlock that might result from high levels of
interest-group engagement.
The lawmaking partnership also exploits the differential institutional
competencies of the Court and Congress. The evaluation of the scope and
quality of private litigation is a subject that is peculiarly within the
competence of the judiciary. The courts can readily observe the quality of
private lawsuits and the extent to which litigation filings are correlated
with serious misconduct. The courts can also determine the effect of
various reforms such as a heightened pleading standard on litigation
volume and case quality. At the same time, Congress has the capacity to
consider evidence that the courts cannot observe. This evidence might
include the effect of litigation costs on issuers’ decisions to go public or to
list their securities in the United States, or the effect of private
enforcement on the capital markets.116 Thus, even with a common
objective, the Courts and Congress can bring distinct issues of competence
to the question of how best to achieve that objective.
By delegating the development of private enforcement to the courts,
Congress creates a potential check on the possibility of agency capture.117
The antifraud provision, like most of the federal securities laws, can be
enforced by the SEC as well as private litigants.118 Some commentators
have advocated for the elimination of private securities fraud litigation,
capture is “particularly pronounced in financial services” because of the substantial industry clout
effected through political donations and lobbying).
115. See, e.g., James R. Copland, How the Plaintiffs Bar Bought the Senate, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8,
2010, 6:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703630404575053330978667138.
116. Congress may also be in a better position than the courts to evaluate effects outside the
litigation context, such as effects on the provision of financial products or the depth of the capital
markets.
117. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (discussing problem of agency capture).
118. See, e.g., What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.
shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2015) (describing the SEC’s enforcement authority).
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arguing for the superiority of public enforcement.119 Yet the effectiveness
of public enforcement depends critically on the SEC’s exercise of its
enforcement authority.120 An important constraint on public enforcement is
the availability of resources—the SEC depends on Congress for funding,
and Congress can limit enforcement activity just by closing the pursestrings.121 In addition, the broad scope of regulation and actors subject to
federal securities regulation requires the SEC to make policy choices. SEC
officials and staff may make such choices for a variety of reasons—such
as a desire to appeal to the media, to further personal career objectives, or
to assuage congressional critics.122 The courts are particularly well
positioned to observe the areas in which SEC enforcement operates
effectively. Although the courts cannot address deficiencies in public
enforcement directly,123 they can identify those areas in which private
enforcement is serving as a useful supplement by targeting conduct or
defendants that are not the focus of the regulators.124
Finally, the lawmaking partnership offers a dynamic process.
Common-law adjudication has long been defended on the basis of its
ability to operate incrementally and to evolve in response to changing
circumstances.125 These features prevent the type of obsolescence that can
occur in both congressional and agency lawmaking. In the context of
financial regulation, this flexibility and responsiveness are particularly
valuable because of the speed at which the market changes, creating new

119. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011).
120. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in
the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1604–05 (2006) (scrutinizing the “revolving
door” of SEC lawyers and private practice and its connection to new regulations).
121. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 319 n.340 (2005)
(quoting Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: Government’s Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 286, 294) (explaining that “the Commission, like most agencies, depends entirely on funds
authorized and appropriated by Congress for its operations”).
122. See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Bickering Stalls Mary Jo White’s
Agenda, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2015, 9:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-bickering-derailswhites-agenda-1433374702 (describing conflict over policy choices of SEC commissioners).
123. Cf. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (raising
concerns about the SEC’s enforcement policy choices and, as a result, refusing to approve proposed
settlement of SEC enforcement action), vacated, 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
124. See, e.g., James D. Cox, et al., Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have
Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893 (2005) (reporting on evidence about
firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions versus firms targeted only by private securities fraud class
actions).
125. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1072–73 (2000) (explaining the advantages of common-law
adjudication as a method of lawmaking).
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regulatory demands. Again, the case of federal securities fraud offers an
illustration. The public capital markets have shifted, over the past sixty
years, from retail to largely institutional markets, with an ever-diminishing
share of US equities held by retail investors.126 Both institutional and retail
money has moved, to an increasing degree, into indexed investments that
are not made on the basis of information disclosure or issuer
fundamentals.127 New types of traders have entered the market, such as
hedge funds and high-frequency traders.128 Market information has shifted
from paper-based disclosure documents to the internet and is conveyed
through an ever-growing range of intermediaries.129 As the nature of the
market changes, so do the nature of securities fraud and the scope of
litigation necessary to deter such fraud effectively, as well as the costs and
benefits of an enforcement regime.
A lawmaking partnership offers two different mechanisms for
identifying and responding to these developments, reflecting the different
expertise and informational access of the courts and Congress. Thus, for
example, Basic responded to the impersonal nature of the public capital
markets by recognizing the difficulty for investors of proving reliance
directly.130 The PSLRA responded to the emergence of institutional
investors by harnessing their larger stakes and greater sophistication in the
form of the lead plaintiff as a way of controlling litigation decisions.131
SLUSA responded to an effort by the plaintiffs’ bar to shift litigation into
state court in order to avoid provisions such as the discovery stay.132 The
Court interpreted the heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA in a
manner that effectively implemented Congress’s gatekeeping objective in

126. Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1961, 1962–63 (2010) (describing shift from retail to institutional ownership); Luis A. Aguilar,
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility (Apr. 19,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808 (explaining
various developments in the size and structure of the capital markets over the past several decades).
127. See, e.g., RUSSELL INVESTMENTS, INDEX INDUSTRY INNOVATION LEADS TO GROWING
ADOPTION OF ETFS AMONG INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 1 (2014) (reporting that “assets in indexbased strategies reached more than $7 trillion worldwide in 2013”).
128. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance,
37 J. CORP. L. 265, 296–97 (2012) (describing the evolution of the “transient” institutional investor).
129. Commentators have observed the challenges posed by these changes for years. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 747 (1985) (exploring the effect of new technology on the costs of gathering and
disseminating investment information); Neil D. Schwartz, Wall Street? Where We’re Going We Don’t
Need Wall Street: Do Securities Regulators Stand a Chance in Cyberspace?, 8 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 79, 83 (1998) (observing that “New Technology Is Reshaping the Securities Markets”).
130. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240–47 (1988).
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2014).
132. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2014).
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light of its observations about the challenges of pleading the required state
of mind.133
V. THE LAWMAKING PARTNERSHIP BEYOND HALLIBURTON II
A. Other Applications of the Partnership Framework
The analysis in this Article is broadly applicable outside the area of
federal securities fraud. Although consideration of the lawmaking
partnership in the context of other statutory schemes is beyond the scope
of this Article, securities regulation alone offers numerous instances in
which the collaborative interplay of congressional and judicial lawmaking
suggests that the Court should apply a more flexible and goal-oriented
approach to interpreting the applicable statute.134 Within federal securities
fraud litigation, evidence of a lawmaking partnership might inform the
Court’s analysis of a variety of issues.
One such issue is the extraterritorial scope of the antifraud provision.
For many years, the courts applied section 10(b) to fraud involving
conduct or effects within the United States.135 Congress did not interfere
with these decisions for decades, allowing the courts to act in a “quasilegislative role.”136 In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Court
overturned these decisions and concluded that section 10(b) did not extend
outside the United States.137 Congress subsequently responded to Morrison
in Dodd-Frank, both by reinstating the conduct and effects tests for SEC
enforcement actions,138 and by ordering the SEC to “solicit public
comment and thereafter conduct a study to determine the extent to which
private rights of action under the antifraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . should be extended.”139

133. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
134. Similarly, the courts should consider the existence of a partnership in evaluating the
legitimacy of agency rulemaking. See Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the
Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 697–98 (2013) (criticizing the DC Circuit
Court’s Business Roundtable decision, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
for ignoring congressional policy judgments about SEC adoption of a federal proxy access rule).
135. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender
Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523, 542–43 (1993) (describing conducts and effects tests).
136. Jennifer Wu, Morrison v. Dodd-Frank: Deciphering the Congressional Rebuttal to the
Supreme Court’s Ruling, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 317, 328 (2011).
137. 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010).
138. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010).
139. Id. § 929Y(a).
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A second issue that has involved collaboration between the Court and
Congress is determining the appropriate scope of liability exposure for
secondary defendants. As with Morrison, the lower courts had applied the
concept of aiding and abetting from the common law to private claims for
federal securities fraud.140 In Central Bank, the Supreme Court rejected
that approach, holding that section 10(b) does not create a cause of action
for aiding and abetting.141 Congress subsequently responded to the
concerns about the potential adverse effects of liability for secondary
defendants in the PSLRA.142 Nonetheless, in Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,143 the Court concluded that
section 10(b) did not provide a private right of action against defendants
who did not make fraudulent statements to the investing public.144 Most
recently, Congress responded in Dodd-Frank with modifications to the
liability exposure of secondary defendants—expanding the SEC’s
authority to bring aiding and abetting claims and lowering the required
state of mind for such liability from knowledge to recklessness.145 In
addition, Dodd-Frank required the US Government Accountability Office
to conduct a study on the impact of a private right of action for aiding and
abetting.146
The partnership analysis also offers insights with respect to the
determination of the required mental state for fraud liability. The Court
rejected negligence based liability in Ernst and held that scienter was the
necessary state of mind, but it declined to define scienter or to determine
whether proof of recklessness was sufficient.147 Congress did not specify
the required state of mind when it adopted the PSLRA. Instead, it crafted
the heightened pleading requirement to incorporate the judicially-created
ambiguity—providing that the plaintiff “state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.”148 In turn, the Court took on the task of interpreting this

140. Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for
Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1999).
141. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170–92
(1994).
142. See Fisch, supra note 140, at 1293–94.
143. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
144. Id. at 154–67.
145. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 929M–O, 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010).
146. Id. § 929Z(a).
147. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 193 n.12 (1976).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2014) (emphasis added).
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provision in Tellabs,149 and it concluded that, because Congress did not
“throw much light” on what was meant by a “strong inference,” its task
was to “prescribe a workable construction . . . geared to the PSLRA’s twin
goals: to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving
investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”150
B. The Lawmaking Partnership and Insider Trading
Perhaps the most compelling example of the lawmaking partnership is
the development of the legal prohibition on insider trading.151 Because the
scope of insider trading regulation and the appropriate role for the
judiciary in developing insider trading law are currently the subject of
some debate152 after the Second Circuit’s recent Newman decision,153 this
Article will briefly consider the implications of the lawmaking partnership
framework for that debate.
Federal insider trading liability is based on section 10(b), the same
general antifraud provision discussed earlier in this Article in the context
of private securities fraud. The statute itself contains no reference to
insider trading or nonpublic information.154 Instead, insider trading
liability has been developed through the joint actions of the Court and
Congress.155
The Court moved first. In Chiarella v. United States, the Court
accepted the premise that trading on material inside information could

149. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
150. Id. at 321–22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1589, 1628 (1999) (arguing that
“the Supreme Court should treat the insider trading prohibition as though it were a species of federal
common law”).
152. See, e.g., Tanya Dmitronow et al., After Newman, Congress Seeks to Define Insider Trading,
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP CORPORATE DEFENSE AND DISPUTES BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.
corporatedefensedisputes.com/2015/03/after-newman-congress-seeks-to-define-insider-trading/ (“Ever
since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its landmark decision in United States v.
Newman, debate has raged about whether the court has sanctioned insider trading or has appropriately
restrained the Government’s efforts to prosecute innocent market conduct—and whether the judiciary,
rather than Congress, should be defining and outlawing insider trading in the first place.”).
153. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
154. See Paul D. Brachman, Note, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
261, 278 (2013) (“There is no federal statute that specifically prohibits [insider trading].”).
155. The actions of the SEC and the Department of Justice in bringing insider trading cases before
the Court obviously play a critical role as well. This Article will address the SEC’s role below. See
infra notes 188–211 and accompanying text.
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constitute securities fraud.156 The Court’s holding was a restrictive one,
however. It concluded that insider trading liability was premised on the
fiduciary duties owed by corporate insiders to the corporation.157
Corporate insiders who possessed no such duties could not be liable under
this classical theory because their failure to disclose material nonpublic
information did not constitute actionable fraud.158 Importantly, the Court
observed that its conclusion was not grounded in the statutory text or a
finding of congressional intent, noting that “neither the legislative history
nor the statute itself affords specific guidance” as to the circumstances in
which “silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device.”159
Chiarella did not address situations in which insiders, rather than
trading themselves, disclose inside information to others who subsequently
trade. In 1983, the Court addressed this so-called “tipping” in Dirks v.
SEC.160 Importantly, Dirks reinforced the Court’s holding in Chiarella that
insider trading required a predicate breach of fiduciary duty.161 In Dirks,
the Court concluded that tippees could only be liable if the tipper breached
a fiduciary duty in disclosing the inside information and if the tippee knew
of the breach.162 Dirks further explained that a tipper breached his or her
duty by receiving a personal benefit in exchange for the tip or if he or she
intended to bestow a gift on the recipient.163
Many commentators were dissatisfied with the limitations on insider
trading liability imposed by the Chiarella and Dirks decisions.164
Commentators also raised objections to the regulatory ambiguity. 165 As
Senator Alfonse D’Amato observed: “the present state of uncertainty
about the law is simply not acceptable.”166 Between 1986 and 1988,
156. 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that
corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not
benefit personally through fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.”).
157. Id. at 224–30.
158. Id. at 231–35.
159. Id. at 226.
160. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
161. Id. at 660.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 663–64.
164. See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips & Larry R. Lavoie, The SEC’s Proposed Insider Trading
Legislation: Insider Trading Controls, Corporate Secrecy, and Full Disclosure, 39 ALA. L. REV. 439,
446–50 (1988).
165. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v.
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 227–28 (1998) (identifying confusion in the law of insider trading and
arguing that “[a]bsent congressional action, the definition of illegal trading on proscribed
informational advantages will remain incomplete, unsystematic, and analytically unsatisfying”).
166. 133 CONG. REC. S16,393 (daily ed. June 17, 1987) (statement of Sen. Alfonse D’Amato).
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Congress held four separate sets of hearings devoted specifically to insider
trading regulation.167
In 1984, Congress adopted its first response to the Chiarella and Dirks
decisions. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984168 did not revise the
judicial approach to insider trading liability or expand the scope of the
prohibition but merely made minor modifications to insider trading
liability, including a prohibition on the trading of options and other
derivatives in circumstances in which it would be illegal to trade stock and
a provision providing for treble damages.169 The adoption of the 1984
statute suggested that Congress was aware of the scope of insider trading
liability reflected in the Dirks and Chiarella decisions and chose not to
alter this scope. Despite the urging of several witnesses, Congress did not
adopt a formal definition of insider trading in the statute.170
In 1987, in response to a request from the Senate Securities
Subcommittee, the SEC drafted proposed legislation that would have
provided a definition of insider trading and modified several aspects of the
Supreme Court’s decisions.171 A specific issue that had divided lower
courts was the extent to which insider trading liability could be premised
on an alternative theory: the misappropriation theory.172 The SEC’s draft
legislation sought to codify the misappropriation theory and to specify the
circumstances and relationships that might give rise to a predicate duty. 173
Congress chose again, however, not to adopt the misappropriation theory
or any type of statutory definition.174 Instead, in the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“ITSFEA”), Congress

167. Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s,
82 IND. L.J. 575, 576 (2007).
168. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (2014).
169. Id.
170. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 13 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286; see also
Painter et al., supra note 165, at 201–02.
171. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CATO INST., CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 101: SEC’S INSIDER
TRADING PROPOSAL: GOOD POLITICS, BAD POLICY (1988), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa101.pdf.
172. See Elliot J. Weiss, United States v. O’Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider
Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395 (1998). The misappropriation theory was based on language in Chief
Justice Burger’s dissent in Chiarella. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 243–45 (1980)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that Chiarella’s misappropriation of information that belonged to his
employer violated section 10(b)).
173. MACEY, supra note 171; see also The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 40
(1987) (statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
174. Painter et al., supra note 165, at 201–02.
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increased the penalties for insider trading and also added a private remedy
for contemporaneous traders.175
Notably, however, Congress did not codify the misappropriation
theory, which was enjoying general acceptance in the lower courts.176
Indeed, ITSFEA contained explicit findings that the SEC’s rules regarding
insider trading were “necessary and appropriate,” and that it had “enforced
such rules and regulations vigorously, effectively, and fairly.”177 As Steve
Thel argues, these findings can be read as a congressional endorsement of
the misappropriation theory.178
The Supreme Court accepted the misappropriation theory in
O’Hagan.179 Importantly, the O’Hagan decision departed from the narrow
approach to insider trading liability reflected in Chiarella and Dirks,
relying instead on policy considerations to support its characterization of
misappropriation as informational fraud.180 As Justice Ginsberg explained,
the misappropriation theory is “tuned to an animating purpose of the
Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote
investor confidence.”181
The O’Hagan decision did not eliminate all confusion over the scope
of insider trading liability exposure.182 The Court’s acceptance of the
misappropriation theory, however, reduced the pressure on Congress to
adopt insider trading legislation.183 This outcome was viewed as less than
optimal by some commentators who had argued that the scope of insider
trading liability should be definitively resolved through legislation.184

175. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (1988).
176. See Weiss, supra note 172, at 398–422.
177. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 2.
178. See generally Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1091 (1997).
179. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
180. See Weiss, supra note 172, at 398 (explaining that the Court “explicitly relied on
considerations of public policy to explain its support for the misappropriation theory”); see also
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658–59 (justifying Court’s holding in terms of the investor’s “informational
disadvantage” relative to the insider).
181. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
182. See Painter et al., supra note 165, at 202 (identifying continuing issues of ambiguity and
concern); cf. Weiss, supra note 172, at 438 (concluding that, although O’Hagan leaves “a few loose
ends,” it “comes close to completing the development of a sensible, comprehensive regulatory
framework”).
183. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court
Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157, 1212 (1997) (“[W]ith
the misappropriation theory firmly in place, Congress lacks the impetus to define through legislation
the parameters of insider trading liability.”).
184. See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1304 n.373 (1998) (citing sources).
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Congress adopted additional insider trading legislation in 2012 when it
passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (“STOCK
Act”).185 The STOCK Act prohibits members of Congress from trading on
inside information.186 Two aspects of the STOCK Act reinforce the
characterization of the development of insider trading regulation as a
collaborative process. First, Congress again declined to provide a statutory
definition of insider trading. Second, in extending the prohibition,
Congress incorporated the fiduciary duty approach reflected in the Court’s
decisions. Specifically, the Act provides that members of Congress owe a
duty of trust and confidence to Congress, the federal government, and US
citizens “solely for purposes of the insider trading prohibitions.”187
C. A Third Partner—The SEC
The example of insider trading introduces an additional dynamic into
the lawmaking process—the SEC. As discussed in Part II of this Article,
commentators have devoted considerable energy to debating the
appropriate extent to which Congress should delegate lawmaking authority
to federal agencies.188 Much of that debate focuses on the appropriate
scope of agency rulemaking. Courts exercise oversight over agency
rulemaking through application of the nondelegation doctrine, although
the Supreme Court’s application of this doctrine has been extremely
limited.189 Courts have also scrutinized agency rulemaking to ensure that it
falls within Congress’s delegation of authority190 and is exercised in a
manner that is not arbitrary and capricious.191
The SEC’s role with respect to insider trading, at least initially, was not
legislative in nature. Rather than formulating the scope of liability through
formal rulemaking, the SEC fashioned the liability standard by bringing
enforcement actions that were, in some cases, supplemented by

185. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (“STOCK Act”), Pub. L. No. 112105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 4(g)(1); see also Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider
Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 849–50 (2013)
(explaining how structure of the STOCK Act incorporated the Court’s fiduciary approach).
188. See supra Part II.
189. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
190. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45
(1984) (holding that courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of statutory authority
rather than substituting their own interpretation).
191. The source of the arbitrary and capricious standard is the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2014); see generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (exemplifying the “hard look” approach to review under the APA).
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Department of Justice criminal prosecutions.192 It was the SEC—not
Congress or the courts—that made the initial decision to use the general
antifraud provision as a basis for imposing insider trading liability.193
Subsequently, the SEC’s enforcement actions have repeatedly tested the
boundaries of existing law and offered new theories of liability.194
Although enforcement has been the agency’s primary lawmaking role,
the SEC has also responded to restrictive judicial decisions through formal
rulemaking. For example, the SEC responded to the narrow scope of the
Chiarella decision by promulgating Rule 14e-3,195 which prohibits insider
trading in connection with a tender offer and does not require a fiduciary
duty.196 The SEC responded to the information asymmetries authorized by
the Dirks decision by adopting Regulation FD.197 The SEC also
“extend[ed] the boundaries of Rule 10b-5 through the promulgation of
Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2.”198 Rule 10b5-1 attempts to resolve a debate
over whether mere possession of material nonpublic information is enough
for liability by prohibiting trading if the defendant is “aware of the
material, nonpublic information” when making the trade.199 Rule 10b5-2
provides a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person
will be deemed to have a relationship of trust and confidence for purposes
of the misappropriation theory.200
The inclusion of the SEC in the lawmaking partnership adds an
additional dimension to the lawmaking process. In many cases, Congress
192. Commentators have termed this approach “regulation by enforcement,” and some have been
highly critical. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 155 (1990); see also John Van De Weert &
Maria Earley, CFPB Blurs Line Between Enforcement, Regulation, NAT’L L.J. (May 25, 2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202727293268/CFPB-Blurs-Line-Between-EnforcementRegulation?slreturn=20151012160901 (describing similar approach by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau).
193. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
194. See, e.g., James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities
Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 151 (2012) (“Throughout the years, the SEC has consistently pushed
the boundaries of insider trading law.”).
195. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2015).
196. Id.; Joseph E. Miller, Jr., Comment, SEC v. Peters: Stabilizing the Regulation of Tender
Offer Insider Trading Without a Fiduciary Duty, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 783, 786 (1994).
197. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015); see Jill Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to
Addressing Information Asymmetry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 112–15 (Stephen
M. Bainbridge ed., 2013).
198. John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of
Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 285.
199. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33,7881, 73 SEC
Docket 3, 19 (Aug. 15, 2000).
200. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 897 (2010) (discussing Rule 10b5-2).
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and the Court have embraced the SEC’s lawmaking initiatives, agreeing
that the SEC’s approach furthered their common policy objectives. Thus,
for example, Congress explicitly found, in section 2 of the ITSFEA, that
the SEC’s rules and regulations governing insider trading were “necessary
and appropriate,” and that the Commission had “enforced such rules and
regulations vigorously, effectively, and fairly.”201 Similarly in O’Hagan,
the Court both accepted the misappropriation theory proffered by the
government as encompassing the necessary deception required by its
earlier decisions202 and upheld the SEC’s adoption of Rule 14e-3.203
In other cases, however, the Court has restrained the SEC’s
enforcement zeal. As noted above, even as the Court accepted insider
trading liability in Chiarella, and extended that liability to tippees in
Dirks, it held that the SEC’s desired scope of liability was too broad.204 In
particular, the Court has rejected the SEC’s desired parity-of-information
standard.205 Similarly, in Dirks, the Court insisted that tippee liability be
premised both upon a breach of fiduciary duty and the tippee’s awareness
of that breach, finding support for this approach in the scienter
requirement.206
Recent enforcements by the SEC have raised similar concerns in the
lower courts. Mark Cuban fought a five-year battle with the SEC and
won.207 Cuban also raised questions about the validity of Rule 10b5-2,
questions that the District Court took seriously208 but were mooted by

201. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, §2, 102
Stat. 4677, 4677 (1988).
202. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (“The misappropriation theory advanced
by the Government is consistent with Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 . . . (1977), a
decision underscoring that § 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains
on conduct involving manipulation or deception.”). Importantly, the Court observed that the scope of
its acceptance of the misappropriation theory was limited by “two sturdy safeguards” provided by
Congress regarding scienter. Id. at 665.
203. Id. at 667.
204. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654–64 (1983).
205. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980).
206. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654–64.
207. Chris Isidore & Gregory Wallace, Jury Rules for Mark Cuban in Insider Case, CNN MONEY
(Oct. 16, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/16/investing/cuban-verdict/.
208. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730–31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that SEC could
not use Rule 10b5-2 to predicate misappropriation liability on the basis of a mere confidentiality
agreement), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010). At trial, the Court instructed the jury that “the SEC
had to prove that Cuban agreed (a) to keep the information confidential, and (b) not to trade on it or
use it for his own benefit.” John Sylvia & Chip Phinney, Insider Trading: Lessons from the Mark
Cuban Jury Verdict, SECURITIES MATTERS (Oct. 18, 2013), https://www.securitiesmatters.com/2013/
10/insider-trading-lessons-from-the-mark-cuban-jury-verdict/.
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changes in the SEC’s theory of liability.209 In United States v. Newman,
the Second Circuit overturned the convictions of two hedge fund
managers, third- and fourth-degree “remote tippees.”210 Citing Dirks, the
court stated that the defendants’ liability required the tipper to obtain a
personal benefit from tipping, and that there was insufficient evidence
even that the insiders had received a personal benefit, and “absolutely no
. . . evidence” that the defendants had any knowledge about a personal
benefit.211
D. Implications of the Lawmaking Partnership for Insider Trading
Existing insider trading law is the product of a lawmaking partnership,
as conceptualized by this Article. Insider trading liability is premised on
section 10(b), an open-textured statute—indeed, the statute is so opentextured that it does not even mention insider trading explicitly. The Court,
Congress, and the SEC have made multiple adjustments and refinements
to the regulation of insider trading. In each case, these adjustments have
been cognizant of and responsive to the efforts of other lawmaking
partners. Finally, as with private securities fraud litigation, the lawmaking
enterprise seeks to appear to share the common objectives of addressing
information disparities in the securities markets and maintaining public
confidence212 while providing sufficient limiting principles to allow the
necessary information flow to preserve healthy and efficient markets.213
Insider trading also demonstrates the advantages of the lawmaking
partnership as a tool to develop financial regulation. Congress, and to
some degree the SEC, have been responsive to politically based concerns
such as the public demand for greater enforcement penalties in the wake of
Wall Street scandals. The Court, with its greater degree of political
insulation, is able to provide a constraint on excess enforcement zeal,
balancing these demands with concerns over predictability, information

209. The Court of Appeals expressly refrained from considering the validity of Rule 10b5-2. See
Cuban, 620 F.3d at 558 n.40.
210. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that defendants
“were several steps removed from the corporate insiders”).
211. Id. at 453–54.
212. For a more nuanced view of congressional objectives in regulating insider trading, see Joo,
supra note 167.
213. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (expressing concern about liability rules
that “could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which . . . is necessary to the
preservation of a healthy market”); Michelle N. Comeau, Comment, The Hidden Contradiction Within
Insider Trading Regulation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1275, 1276–77 (2006) (“Congress, the SEC, and the
judiciary have each stated that the goal of insider trading regulation is to promote investor
confidence—the certitude of investors at large that the market is fair.”).
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flow, and market efficiency. Judicial oversight can also check headlinedriven lawmaking agendas, pushing particularly the SEC to justify its
regulatory choices better.214 Thus, for example, the Court’s decision in
Dirks led the SEC to focus its efforts to reduce information asymmetries
on issuer disclosure rather than recipient use of material nonpublic
information through the adoption of Regulation FD.215 The Second
Circuit’s decision in Newman may similarly encourage the SEC to direct
greater attention to tippers/sources rather than remote tippees.216 Congress
also weighed in to readjust the SEC’s enforcement priorities with the
adoption of the STOCK Act.217 Notably, prior to the legislation, no
member of Congress had been the subject of an insider trading
enforcement action218 despite evidence suggesting widespread use of
material nonpublic information.219
Finally, the lawmaking partnership is well positioned to respond to the
dynamic structure of the securities markets and the evolution of
information flow due to changes in technology and market participants.
Since the Chiarella decision, the markets have seen the emergence of
many new types of traders and trading strategies—hedge funds, highfrequency traders, algorithmic trading, and index funds are all examples.220
Competition has led to new demands for information, which are met by
innovations such as web crawlers, expert network firms, electronic road
shows, and more.221

214. To the extent that the SEC has, in recent years, become increasingly politicized, especially
with respect to its enforcement policy, this judicial constraint can be viewed as balancing both the
SEC, directly, and Congress, indirectly. See, e.g., Ackerman & Viswanatha, supra note 122
(describing politicization of SEC enforcement decisionmaking).
215. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Newman Reins in Criminal Prosecution of Remote Tippees for Insider
Trading, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/
28/newman-reins-in-criminal-prosecution-of-remote-tippees-for-insider-trading/ (arguing that “the
Newman prosecution illustrates a problematic theme in the recent government policy of pursuing the
end users of inside information rather than the source”). In Dirks, the Court specifically highlighted
this objective. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–63 (quoting In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 648
(1971)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (observing: “It is important in this type of case to focus on
policing insiders and what they do . . . .”).
217. See supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.
218. Brachman, supra note 154, at 264.
219. See, e.g., Joshua Michael Brick, The Stock Act: Is it Necessary and If So Is It a Sufficient
Solution?, 15 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 179, 193 (2013) (citing “the lack of cases prosecuting insider trading by
members of Congress, combined with Congress’ consistently high portfolio returns”).
220. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (describing emergence of new types of traders, including “hedge fund
rapid-fire volatility traders, index fund investors, [and] sophisticated value investors”).
221. See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal
Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151,
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These developments offer new challenges—both in defining material
nonpublic information and in identifying the manners of acquiring that
information that should be characterized as improper.222 While the
financial incentives for acquiring an informational advantage are higher
than ever, the value of maintaining a rich information environment offers
reasons to be cautious about expansive liability provisions. A lawmaking
partnership is well suited to maintaining the necessary balance.
These insights are of particular value in the aftermath of the Newman
decision.223 The Newman decision renewed the long-dormant efforts to
have Congress adopt a definition of insider trading.224 Some commentators
have pointed to the decision as demonstrating the need for legislation to
ensure that courts do not interpret the law too narrowly.225 Properly
understanding insider trading regulation as the product of a lawmaking
partnership, however, rebuts that claim and demonstrates that judicial
oversight has provided a valuable counterbalance to regulatory excess
while retaining flexibility to address market innovation.226 As SEC Chair
Mary Jo White explained: “I think it’s challenging to codify [insider
trading law] clearly in a way that is both not too broad and retains the
strength of common law.”227
VI. CONCLUSION
Commentators have identified a variety of structural and political
pressures that constrain the effectiveness of the lawmaking process with

172–73 (2011) (describing how investment information can rapidly move through the market through
innovations such as spiders, also known as web crawlers).
222. See id.; see also SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (remanding for trial court
to consider whether computer hacking was “deceptive” within the meaning of section 10(b)).
223. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
224. See Peter J. Henning, Court Strikes on Insider Trading, and Congress Lobs Back, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/business/dealbook/courtstrikes-on-insider-trading-and-congress-lobs-back.html (describing the Reed-Menendez Bill, Stop
Illegal Insider Trading Act (S.702), and the Lynch Bill, Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015 (H.R.1173));
Dmitronow et al., supra note 152 (same).
225. See, e.g., SEC v. Payton, No. 14 Civ. 4644, 2015 WL 1538454, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6,
2015) (suggesting that Congress is the appropriate body to define illegal insider trading).
226. The Supreme Court has expressed continued willingness to exercise such oversight; it
recently agreed to hear another insider trading case, Salman v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 899 (2016)
(No. 15-628) (granting petition for certiorari).
227. Ben Conarck, SEC’s White Says Agency Mulled Insider Trading Ban, LAW360 (Mar. 24,
2015, 6:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/635363/sec-s-white-says-agency-mulled-insidertrading-ban (quoting SEC Chair Mary Jo White).
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respect to financial regulation.228 The lawmaking partnership offers one
possible response. Through a judicial-congressional collaboration, the
lawmaking partnership enables the courts and Congress to temper their
own institutional shortcomings. This has led, in the context of private
securities litigation, to a balance that serves the dual objectives of investor
protection and limiting the potential for litigation abuse. The structural
advantages of the lawmaking partnership support both deference to this
balance and a broader endorsement of the lawmaking partnership.
In the case of Halliburton II, the implications of this analysis suggest
that the Court reached the correct result in declining to overrule Basic,
although perhaps for the wrong reasons. More broadly, the analysis
suggests that the Court should give greater weight to congressional action
in considering the scope of private litigation under section 10(b), and,
where Congress has participated in a collaborative process with objectives
common to those of the Court, that the Court should view that
participation as authorization to engage in its own policy analysis in
furtherance of those objectives. Judicial lawmaking in this context should
be understood not as unprincipled activism, but as consistent with a
congressional choice of a lawmaking approach that offers distinctive
advantages.
228. See Levitin, supra note 114, at 2068 (calling for a reform to “the politics of financial
regulation”).
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